This chapter investigates the anti-corruption argument for a principle of comparability between public and private sectors determining HPO remuneration in Singapore. on the mechanism of the principle of comparability, and on the Claim that a comparable salary is a demand of justice.
Introduction
Singapore is a unique metropolis island, with a short but rich history. It is a story of economic success. When Thomas Raffles, officer of the British East India Company, arrived on Singapore in 1819, the island was largely uninhabited. After initial conflict with the Dutch over trading, the Anglo-Dutch treaty of 1824 meant that the settlement of Singapore, in British hands, was there to stay. As a free trade port with no taxes, Singapore's economic importance became immense in the area, its population growing to 10,000 in it needs to be combined with competition, and the selection of the best candidates. Labor competition is thus the final ingredient in the policy of HPO remuneration. Singapore has a unique characteristic regionally; being small and contained, it reached the saturation point of its labor-intensive low value markets much earlier than its neighbors did. Further, its size and history as a free trading harbor limited Singapore's competitive edge over regional lowwage countries. To ensure economic growth could continue, a transition had to be made to high-tech capital-intensive operations. 15 Further, to ensure a stratified and competitive labor market, top-bottom pay differentials were widened in times of economic uncertainty. These human resources strategies, a-typical of a developing nation, were central to Singapore developing a relatively small, increasingly efficient and competitive civil service, with a very well paid leadership.
A high reward for successful public 'service' is thus considered in Singapore the right choice for both intrinsic (justice-based) and extrinsic (pragmatic) reasons. The pragmatic moral lies in the anti-corruption element and paying for the 'best and brightest'. The intrinsic, or justice-based element is just as significant. As the above quote shows, Lee
Kuan Yew believes the political top deserved top salaries. This is an essentially cultural attitude. Where the British tradition of political remuneration finds its lineage in the aristocratic attitude that men free from "the taint of sordid greed" should hold public office, 16 modern Singapore defines itself by economic success and growth. It would have been strange for a country founded on the principles of free trade and open competition to exclude political offices and civil servants from a 'fair' reward for hard work well done.
To conclude, as an anti-corruption measure, a competitive measure to attract good candidates in a limited market, and a manifestation of the Singaporean conception of desert, a series of pay rises for the public service began in 1972 and continued in the years 1973, 1979, 1981, 1986 and 1989 . The pay raises were defended both in terms of defending high public office (and the civil service) from a 'brain drain' toward the private sector, and, in terms attracting the best individuals to public office, the latter being emphasized more as time went by. It was argued that for high public office and the civil service to remain competitive in a growth economy with a limited labor market, salaries had to be It seems that the Singaporean argument against corruption is misleading in that it claims to support a principle of comparability while in fact justifying an absolute level of HPO remuneration (i.e. 'pay HPOs 'well' or risk corruption'). The crux of the problem is that the purely monetary motive for corruption cannot be reduced by an arbitrary principle comparing different sectors of the labor market. Rather, the salary of officials must be sufficient to prevent officials from being tempted by bribes. However, a rigid approach to setting the sufficiency threshold is not enough. If the pay of HPOs is assessed at t 1 , and a salary is proposed that is deemed sufficient to allay the temptation of corrupt practices, there is no logical reason that that salary is still sufficient to that end, at t 2 . This problem could be avoided with the following formulation of the Claim: 'Singaporean HPOs should be paid a salary sufficient to adequately minimize the risk of fiscally motivated corruption'.
Clearly though, this formulation departs from an argument defending the Singaporean system of comparative pay.
All is not lost however, when we recognize that there may be a link between "a salary sufficient to adequately minimize the risk of fiscally motivated corruption" and the principle of comparison with the private sector. This introduces a concept of fairnessthat a comparative salary is likely to be perceived as fair -and a theory of corruption:
that people paid fairly are unlikely to engage in corrupt practices. The Warrant 'paying HPOs less than a comparative salary results in corrupt HPOs' thus also functions as a second Claim. The Data to the Warrant (Warrant\Data) holding that 'a salary less than comparative to the private sector is unfair', and its Warrant (Warrant\Warrant) being the idea that 'paying a salary perceived as fair is sufficient to minimize the risk of corruption among HPOs'.
This Warrant (Warrant\Warrant) is of course an empirical Claim in its own right. As such, it warrants some attention -it is interesting to test it to plausibility -but to some degree functions as a termination of this thread of analysis. Political philosophy will not aid further here. The interesting point of argument at this level is of course the Data (Warrant\ Data) to the Warrant. This holds that 'a salary less than comparative to the private sector is unfair'. This implicit Claim is normative, and it is the vital 'second level' of analysis, whose accuracy determines the relevance of the anti-corruption argument as a whole. We are of course asking about fairness from an embedded, culturally contingent perspective. It is not important that the Data (Warrant\Data) holds up to a universal\platonic standard of 'fairness'; it is important that it is coherent from the perspective of Singaporean work culture.
It is clear that the Data (Warrant\Data) I have proposed is a Claim in its own right. I have argued that a concept of fairness has to be key here to avoid the 'individual variance' and 'hypothetically comparative' problems. The Backing therefore rests on an understanding of corruption that treats it as arising primarily as a symptom of discontent fed by perceived 'unfair' treatment. On this understanding, for HPOs to deviate from the accepted (uncorrupt) standard of action, they must feel aggrieved. This logic allows us to disregard those exceptionally corruptible or greedy HPOs (the exceptions to the general rule) or those exceptionally needy HPOs 28 (who would need to cheat to meet their needs) both of who would not be moved by a principle of comparative pay anyway.
Removing then purely material and pathological motivation, just psychological motives remain. Psychological motives for acting outside of the morally expected norms can be considered well using the split categories that the theoretical discussion of ethnic conflict has popularized, most prominently by economist and political scientist Paul Collier. The grievance vs. greed debate in that field accurately sums the scope of psychological motivators for actions outside of the morally expected norm typified by emotions of envy, jealousy, anger, revenge and injustice. While a theory of corruption must acknowledge elements of greed and grievance, human resources mechanisms against corruption understandably focus on the grievance factors. This is because greed motivated crimes are (perhaps mistakenly) seen as constants to be addressed by punitive measures. Essentially, the argument for comparative salaries as 'corruption minimizing' compares two hypothetical situation where the greed motivations are equal.
28 Serious material need as a reason for corruption is rare in countries such as Singapore, where officials are paid more than the median wage and the cost of living is not excessive. I will seek to present a version of this argument that may seem more attractive\intuitive than this formulation in an attempt to put it in its best light. Singapore it has been claimed that fluctuating a portion of HPOs pay to the economy (as the principle of comparability generally does, albeit less forcefully than GDP or a non top-heavy average) strengthens the ties of the ministers to the country, as in economic crises, the ministers also receive a pay decrease. However, this cannot relay work in practice, because though most private sector company executives receive less pay in an economic downturn, the top aggregate of the top earners (the calculation of which is how Singapore sets its benchmark) is necessarily weighted toward the upper end of the scale. If there are some industries profiting from the downturn, or even some that are hit less hard by the unfavorable economic climate, then the overall negative effect is cushioned for those ministers paid by the comparative mechanisms. This point about downturns just puts into focus a more general problem with Singapore's mechanism of comparability. While the 6-member 'industry set' remains constant, the actual set of the members of the private sector changes on a yearly basis. As the average is taken from the absolute top positions yearly and not a comparative cohort of individuals, the trend is one of unWarranted upward mobility for HPO pay.
The element of the anti-corruption argument that remains to be scrutinized is the Data to the Warrant (Warrant\Data): 'a salary less than comparative to the private sector is unfair' from the perspective of fairness. This is the most problematic in terms of analysis as it is difficult to formulate an argument from fairness that does not rely from the outset on some normative assumptions. Of course, normative elements of an evaluation can be defended through argument, but the risk remains that we deviate too far from the task at hand: an evaluation of actual, 'real world' discourse. It is not appropriate to attempt some brilliant deconstruction assessing the philosophical conception of fairness to demonstrate conclusively the cogency or validity of the arguments advanced in Singapore's remunerative policy. Further, the 'fairness' debate in Singapore, though limited, does take place between opposing moral positions. The political discourse on these differences in relation to public pay sadly does not live up to an engagement with the nature of the ideas of the other. Instead, when discussing differing conceptions of 'fairness' in relation to the salary of HPOs, it seems that Singaporean parliamentarians and other participants in the debate are more involved in a mutual (though unbalanced) presentation of differences wrapped in impressive rhetoric. It would therefore be dishonest to say that the normative Claim that free market remuneration is 'fair' is a generally accepted social fact arising from Singapore's unique political culture.
Of course, any formulation of the argument from fairness rests primarily on intuitions regarding the question: What is fair? The inference that the Data to the Warrant (Warrant\Data) is controversial and depends to some degree on personal intuitions is not groundbreaking. To attempt a more meaningful analysis, and to avoid the thankless task of attempting to piece together a Verifier for the Data that does not really exist in the discourse in order then to assess its validity, requires putting forward the best version of the Data to the Warrant (Warrant\Data) possible. I must stress that I have not come across the following argument in either the political debate or other sources, but present it as a possible foundation for the Data to the Warrant (Warrant\Data) (and therefore a possible interpretation of the third level Warrant (Warrant\Data\Warrant), the 'free market' desertClaim). Earlier in the chapter I presented some practical concerns regarding the principle of comparability. Here I attempt to show that perhaps, from the perspective of fairness, apples and oranges (i.e. public and private sector jobs) are maybe not so different after all.
There are many situations in recent memory when differences between people have been used to discriminate between the treatment of the one or the other. All of the characteristics that may serve to identify people, or to categorize them, have been abused by the powerful at one point or the other. Race, gender, nationality, sexual orientation and religion are prominent examples of such characteristics. One form of discrimination is monetary, namely, paying one individual less than another for the same work because of their belonging to a discriminated group. Indeed, the cry 'equal pay for equal work'
has been a standard-bearer for many in rights movements -most characteristically the women's rights movement, where differentiated pay is so easy to identify and so hard to justify. On my view, the underlying feeling of this demand, that 'it is a demand of justice to pay women the same wage as men for the same work', or indeed the general version that 'people ought not to be arbitrarily discriminated against by being paid differently than others for equal work' satisfied most moral intuitions.
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In the United States, to take a specific example, agitation for legislation enforcing equal pay for women led to the Equal Pay Act (1963) . This Act held that "equal work… the performance of which requires equal skill, effort and responsibility" 34 should be rewarded equally for men and women. It is using these three conditions then, that I suggest an attempt to defend the principle of comparability between the public and private sector should be made. The onus can thus be shifted from demonstrating that public servants deserve equal pay to their private sector peers to detailing why, when the skill, effort and responsibility a public sector employee may use in their work is equal to that required of a private sector employee, their salaries should be different.
The underlying thought of this approach is that there are no relevant differences, considering the requisites of equal skill, effort and responsibility, between private and public sector positions of comparable position, to Warrant a different pay level. This does not however solve the problem, even purely from a level of value (earlier points in this evaluation demonstrating that there are many other difficulties of practical and theoretical nature). After all, what the argument may secure is that there should not be an arbitrary difference in the pay of public and private sector employees -it does nothing to ensure that the benchmark for comparison should be the private sector. To relate this to our example:
while it may be the case that men and women ought not to be remunerated differently for arbitrary reasons, it does not follow that women's pay should be increased; it may be that men are paid more than their just deserts, and that rectification ought to decrease their pay.
There are also two more fundamental problems. Firstly, it is very difficult to ascertain whether in fact public and private sector employees require for their jobs the same levels of skill, effort and responsibility. This problem is exasperated when one attempts to formulate any exact mechanism for comparing these aspects. Second, it is very difficult to determine what the right scope of comparison would be between public and private sector reward.
While for the private sector it may seem appropriate to use such a stunted tool as dollars and cents (although anyone who has passed up a higher paying job can tell you why it is incomplete), it is common and intuitive to suppose that some people are motivated to work in the public sector for other reasons; public spiritedness, community, and service all seem desiderata of public servants, where they may not apply (as well) to for-profit industry.
Conclusion
Using the tools of Analytic Discourse Evaluation, and the work of philosopher Stephen
Toulmin on the structure of argument, this chapter has sought to reconstruct and evaluate a central argument in the political discourse in Singapore justifying a principle of comparability between the public and the private sector for top public officials.
From the reconstruction of the arguments made by political actors in Singapore, the deserves is best determined by their 'free market' value') put some pressure on the principle of comparability that Singaporean HPO remuneration uses. One of the problems that arose was that different 'logics' might operate in the private and public sectors. Thus, an individual well suited for private sector employment may not be equally high performing in the public sector, and vice versa. Further, the mechanism that Singapore uses to calculate comparability was shown to be flawed in that it tied HPOs to particular ranks in the private sector, rather than a particular cohort of people. The result is that HPO pay is upwardly mobile no matter what the state of the economy of the six 'comparable' industries.
Third, in searching for Backing to support the Data of the Warrant (Warrant\Data: that, 'a salary less than comparative to the private sector is unfair'), this chapter offered an argument relying on the intuitively appealing notion of 'equal work for equal pay'. This turned the tables in the process of justification, asking what could justify arbitrary pay differentials between public and private sector workers. However, the Backing to the Data of the Warrant (Warrant\ Data\Backing) could not be determined definitively. Testing out the boundaries of this argument raised new problems: why would it result (in theory) in a demand for public sector workers pay to be raised, rather than a demand for private sector pay to be lowered? Further, to use a common idiom, maybe there really is a difference between apples and oranges in this case. After all, public service is commonly said to be its own reward. While this may not be true entirely, is there nothing of public service that provides public servants with a feeling of worthiness and satisfaction apart from their wage slip? That may be too grim a conclusion.
